INTRODUCTION
Cotton is a key crop in sub-saharan Africa (SSA): it is a major source of foreign currency for a number of countries, the primary cash-crop for millions of rural households and one of the only export products for which the continent"s market share in global trade has increased over the past decades Baffes, 2009b) . Being grown mainly by smallholders, it is believed to play a key role for development and poverty reduction (Badiane et al., 2002; Moseley and Gray, 2008) .
Since the late 1980s, Africa"s "white gold" as it is sometimes called has been at the centre of a harsh debate on how best its production can be encouraged and, particularly, on the role governments should play in this process. Indeed, in many countries, markets have historically been organised around public or para-public companies enjoying a monopoly on cotton transformation and export and, especially in west and central Africa (WCA), on related activities such as input provision and transport (these companies are referred to in the literature as boards or parastatals in the WCA context). However, starting in the late 1980s and, increasingly since the mid-1990s, reforms have been adopted in a large number of countries. The nature of reforms has widely varied across countries and regions, ranging from far-reaching market and price liberalizations to only very marginal adjustments.
Because reforms have not always yielded the expected impacts and because several countries are still considering different reform options, the institutional puzzle remains unsettled. As a result, the literature on cotton sector reforms has dramatically expanded over the past decade. While in the 1980s and 1990s it was prospective and consisted mainly of recommendations, numerous retrospective assessments have been performed over the past few years. Reform processes have however been studied mainly on a case-by-case basis (notable exceptions being Goreux et al., 2002; Araujo-Bonjean et al., 2003; Tschirley et al., 2009 and 2010; Delpeuch et al., 2010) , and concentrate on a small number of countries. Moreover, policy changes have often been studied only shortly after their implementation and, while institutional and regulatory changes are sometimes described in detail, most of the existing literature primarily evaluates the impact of these changes rather than characterises them.
3 This paper thus aims at giving a full panorama of how market organisation has evolved in all SSA cotton producing countries from the early 1960s, that is, before the independence of many countries in the region, to the present time. We refer to "market organisation" to describe both market structure and the nature of ownership, as well as the regulatory framework, understood as the set of rules which govern market entry, pricing, and all aspects of cotton production, transformation and sales. Based on an extensive review of the literature, we compile indices describing the evolution of market organisation in 25 countries from 1961 to 2008. 1 This enables us to make two contributions to the literature.
First, by computing average degrees of competition, private ownership and price intervention at different sub-regional levels, we verify whether the trends in cotton market organisation identified in the literature hold when expanding the sample of countries under consideration and the study period. With a series of nuances, we confirm key findings for the different periods up the late 1990s: markets were indeed initially more integrated in WCA; they became overwhelmingly integrated across all SSA during the 1970s and 1980s and were then significantly disintegrated in a number of countries, mainly in ESA, in the early to mid-1990s. This confirmation of trends and patterns suggests that cotton policies were very uniform at the sub-regional level. However, our results for the later post-reform period significantly alter the conclusions commonly accepted in the literature. Indeed, we find that what we call the "disintegration" trend of the 1990s, that is the combination of both increased participation of the private sector and greater competition, was not the start of a process as it is often claimed to be. Indeed, it has not been followed by other countries in the following decade: while, this first series of reforms has been followed by a second series of reforms, the latter have led to the creation of hybrid markets with mixed ownership and regulation but no competition. Besides, we find that liberalization has even been reversed in a number of marginal producing countries. As a result, markets are increasingly diverse across SSA but competition remains limited: over fifty percent of total production still originates from non-competitive countries where prices are fixed.
Second, expanding the information available to the largest possible array of countries and reporting key policy or institutional changes with precise time indications, and in a consistent manner for 4 25 countries, brings new opportunities for quantitative empirical work on the link between market structure and performance in African cotton sectors or the political economy of cotton policies.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we comment on the methodology adopted to review cotton policies: we outline the criteria chosen to characterise cotton markets and reforms and describe our sources of information. In section 3, we identify patterns and trends in cotton sector organisation at the SSA level and for sub-groups of countries. We conclude in section 4.
METHODOLOGY: CREATING INDICES

Characterising cotton markets
Building on the literature assessing the links between market organisation and performance, we have identified a number of questions that we use as guidelines to characterise markets and describe their evolution. 2 We focus on identifying episodes of market integration (which we understand as moves towards reduced competition, increased state ownership and price intervention) and episodes of market disintegration (which we understand, conversely, as moves towards more competition and private ownership as well as no price intervention). The works by Tshirley et al. (2009 and 2010) were particularly helpful to do so as they rest on a typology of cotton markets against which a number of performance indices are examined.
To understand how market organisation has evolved, it is important to recall that market organisation in SSA cotton markets is closely related both to the SSA rural context and to the specific requirements of cotton production (Poulton et al., 2004) . Indeed, farmers need costly inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and sometimes seeds)especially in West and Central Africa where agro-climatic conditions are less favourable. They however face strong cash constraints as credit markets are almost non-existent in rural areas. As a result, production occurs almost exclusively through interlinked transactions whereby inputs are provided on credit by the ginning companies. 3 Changes in market organisation have specific implications in such a context of imperfect markets and prevalence of linkages between input and output markets. This is all the more the case that formal contract enforcement 5 institutions are typically absent in many countries of SSA among other reasons because of the oral nature of many arrangements, the geographical dispersion of agents and the weakness of judiciary systems (Delpeuch et al., 2010; Poulton et al., 2004) .
Competition is believed to influence performance through its impact on the share of the world price received by farmers, which in turn impacts the area under cultivation and the amount of effort that farmers put into production. Yet, competition is also expected to impact the scope for side-selling, where farmers sell their cotton to other buyers at harvest, instead of to the company that has pre-financed their inputs. This in turns impacts the sustainability of inputs credit systems and thus ultimately yields and areas under cultivation (Delpeuch et al., 2010; Poulton et al., 2004) . In addition, competition is believed to influence firms" efficiency through the creation of cost minimization incentives, or, conversely, the suppression of economies of scale or the introduction of new transaction costs (Delpeuch et al., 2010) .
Finally, Larsen (2003) and Poulton et al. (2004) have identified a strong link between competition and companies" ability to coordinate on quality issues as, for example, avoiding mixing of seed varieties in different regions or enforcing strong quality requirements.
Another key aspect of market organisation is price fixation: are producer prices determined by the market, are indicative prices announced by the government, or are prices fixed? Indeed, fixed prices that apply throughout the year and the country (i.e. pan-territorial and pan-seasonal prices) have been heralded as a risk mitigation and spatial redistribution instrument (Araujo-Bonjean et al., 2003) . They however discourage production from the most productive farmers, and conversely encourage production by less efficient farmers. Besides, price fixation by the government most often results in (implicit) taxation or, alternatively, in unsustainable subsidies (Baffes, 2009b) .
Finally, the nature of ownership is expected to impact efficiency. First, private sector involvement in ginning and cotton-related activities is indeed often seen as improving efficiency through the removal of soft budget constraints, excessive employment or political interference in management (Baffes, 2009b) .
Second, good performance is sometimes attributed to the involvement of colonial enterprises or their 6 counterparts after independence (referred to as ex-colonial institutions)either directly or through lagged effects of past interventions . In this perspective, we thus also report colonial ties. 4
Sources and information compilation
As much as possible, we attempted to answer the above questions with "objective" information such as official law and regulation documents or reports of international organisations. The latter are indeed more comparable across countries and time than interview-or survey-based information (Conway et al., 2005) .
However, we used information emanating from the local and international press, the literature 5 and interviews for two reasons. First, objective information sources were not available for all the countries under scrutiny and, second, this enabled us to account for the fact that poor rule enforcement and/or informal rules also impact market organisation. 6 For example, establishing the actual degree of competition of a market ideally requires information not only on the number of firms active in the market and their respective market shares, but also on their strategic behaviour and on the degree of ownership concentration behind firms with different names. Similarly, the role of regulatory bodies is sometimes difficult to assess without knowing the context in some detail. Based on such additional information, we report the date of effective changes, rather than the date of the official decisions underlying these changes when they differ.
When compiling the information, we refrained from using composite indices to be as transparent as possible. In this respect, our indices are different from those in Giuliano and Scalise (2009) , the only other agricultural market regulation indices that we are aware of. In that paper, government intervention in cash crop markets is given a score between one and four. 7 Alternatively, in this paper, (i) different indices are reported for the different dimensions of market organisation that we identified in the above section (competition, ownership and price intervention) and (ii) degrees in each of these dimensions are reported as separate dummy variables rather than scores. For example, in terms of competition, four dummy variables indicate whether the market is monopolistic, regulated, moderately competitive or strongly competitive. Doing so allows us identifying a number of policy trends that would not appear otherwise. Senegal, Madagascar or Togo) are rarely examined. Aggregating the findings of these studies however allows raising a number of key findings, which can be summarized as follows:
COTTON POLICIES IN SSA 1960-2009
Cotton policies in the literature
 In the 1960s, market integration and public ownership were higher in WCA than in ESA. In the immediate post-independence era, however, very little change occurred in WCA, while, in ESA, nationalisations led to increased market integration (Delpeuch, 2009; Isaacman and Roberts, 1995) .
 Starting in the late 1980s, and increasingly since the mid-1990s, the privatisation and liberalisation of all the cotton sub-sectors were advocated by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with the objective of strengthening their competitiveness, ensuring their financial sustainability and allowing a fair sharing of the profits between producers and ginners (Badiane et al., 2002) . Such reforms were adopted rapidly in a number of countries, mainly in ESA, with diverging results ranging from significant upsurges in the degree in competitionfor example in Tanzania (Poulton, 2009 ) to the creation of almost duopolistic marketsfor example in Zambia or Zimbabwe at some points in time (Brambilla and Porto, 2009; Poulton and Hanyami-Mlambo, 2009 ). Everywhere, the state stepped out of ownership.
 Resistance to market reforms has been much stronger in WCA. While some privatization has taken place, markets have been liberalized only very partially and prices remain fixed to a large extent. Regional monopsonies or systems of administrative allocation of production among buyers have been adopted by a number of countries (Baffes, 2009a; Delpeuch, 2009 ).
 Tschirley et al. (2010) give the most up-to-date and documented comparative evaluation of the latest policy trends. They find that the post-reform period is characterised by increasing diversity across countries in terms of market organisation and regulatory arrangements and increasing variability over time. Second, they establish that the general dynamic is mostly towards increased competition, with (i) reforms foreseen in non-reforming countries and (ii) a tendency of moderately competitive markets to become increasingly competitive. They however note that voluntary policy moves have been undertaken in a limited number of countries in order to explicitly limit competition in strongly competitive markets (Tschirley et al., 2010) .
1960s-1980s: An era of market integration
To describe average market organisation at different points in time, we compute annually (i) the number of countries per level of competition, per degree of private sector ownership and per pricing system as well as (ii) the share of production emanating from each of these groups of countries. Graphs are drawn first at the SSA level (figure 1), but also differentiate between WCA and ESA (figures 2 and 3, respectively) as well as between former French and British colonies (figures 4 and 5).
As pictured in figure 1 , market organisation varied across SSA in the early 1960s although over half the countries already had monopolistic markets (figure 1-A) and no private ownership ( figure 1-C) .
In WCA, competition was absent in almost 90 percent of markets, and a majority were monopolistic ( figure 2-A) . The Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Gambia and Togo were the only countries where cotton sectors were not monopolistic but regulated or moderately competitive and where some private ownership was allowed. Prices were fixed everywhere, except in Togo (figure 2-E).
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In ESA, by contrast, over three markets out of four were competitive at the beginning of our study period (figure 3-A) and only two were monopolistic (Malawi and Madagascar). Private ownership was also much higher in ESA than in WCA: it was null only in the two monopolistic markets and the Sudan were thus less marked than might be thought of when looking at markets only.
As shown in figure 3 , market organisation remained very stable in WCA after the independences (that is from the mid to late 1960s to the late 1980s), and even more so in former French colonies ( figure   4 ). 8 Conversely, changes were important in ESA: competition declined and regulated markets were transformed into monopolies while public ownership increased very significantly. By the early 1980s, almost three markets out of four were monopolistic and entirely public in ESA (figures 3-A and 3-C). 9 As soon as the mid-1970s prices were fixed everywhere but in Mozambique, where the prices announced were only indicative (figure 3-E).
While broadly confirming the patterns identified in the literature (namely market uniformity within SSA sub-regions and a higher initial degree of integration in WCA), our indices highlight the fact that market organisation quickly became similar in WCA and in ESA. Between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, markets were, on average, as integrated in ESA as they were in WCA. Besides, our indices suggest that the commonly used distinction between WCA and ESA should not be understood as a geographical distinction but rather as a shortcut denomination for colonial ties.
Late-1980s-early 2000s: different reform paths
Going back to figure 1 We document more precisely the timing and the places where the different types of reforms took place by looking at sub-regional levels.
Changes were indeed very different in ESA and in WCA, or rather in former British colonies and in former French colonies. Indeed, contrary to common beliefs, the first breakthrough occurred in WCA where the cotton sector remained monopolistic and purely state-owned. Production shares followed similar trends: in the mid-1990s, the shares of monopolistic and regulated markets dropped sharply (to almost nothing in the late 1990s) to the benefit of competitive markets ( figure 3-B) . Similarly, the shares of production emanating from publicly-owned markets and from markets with fixed prices shrank drastically at the same time ( figure 3-D) .
In contrast, in non-Anglophone WCA, reforms have been much more recent and much more restricted in scope: the number of monopolies has declined only gradually, and to the benefit of regulated markets, not to the benefit of competitive markets ( figures 2-A and 2-B) . Public ownership has also declined, with an acceleration of this trend in the late 1990s, but very few markets have become fully operated by private agents (figures 2-C and 2-D). 10 Burkina Faso, private investors were allowed to enter ginning (in 1995, the late 1990s, 1999 and 2003) yet governments remained major shareholders of the former parastatals that continued to operate, competition remained strictly constrained and price fixation was not challenged. Finally, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Senegal and Madagascar all privatised their parastatals (in 1990, 2000, 2003 and 2004) , but continued to guarantee their monopoly position (or failed to attract competitors in the Central African Republic). As a result, by the end of the 1990s, the private sector was operating in only about half the markets of WCA and competition remained restrained in over three countries out of four.
About 80 percent of production continued to originate from markets where prices were fixed.
Regarding the "structural adjustment" period, our results again broadly confirm the key result found in the literature, namely that of prompter and deeper reforms in ESA. The nuance identified in the preceding section however still holds: patterns again strongly reflect colonial origin rather than geography (as illustrated by comparing figures 2 and 3 with figures 4 and 5). This observation suggests a strong pathdependence of institutional history.
Since the early-2000s: The end of disintegration?
The changes observed during the structural adjustment period led to some of the conclusions reached in Tschirley et al. (2010) : a clear trend towards more competition and, as result, greater diversification of market organisation. In what follows, we highlight a mitigation of the disintegration trend and thus even greater diversity in market organisation. Two phenomena contribute to this evolution.
First, competition has overall ceased to increase since the early 2000s. To make this clearer, in figure 6 , we graph the number of countries and their share of production according to whether markets display any level of competition (i.e. moderate or strong) or none (i.e. being monopolistic or regulated).
In SSA, figure 6 -A shows that the combined number of monopolistic and regulated markets has increased anew in the first half of the 2000s and is back to level of the mid-1990s. This is also true in ESA ( Second, we also observe a partial reversal of the privatisation trend in WCA: the private sector does not operate anymore in the Central African Republic (since 2007), Gambia (since 1996) and Guinea (since 2008). An apparent difficulty to re-regulate is worth noting. Fifteen to twenty years after reforms were initiated, situations seem far from stable: since the mid-2000s, the reform processes have even been reversed in one way or another in about half the countries under consideration.
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Building on our country-case studies, we find that the observations described above are the result of three types of market re-integration: state driven and private sector driven regulation and indirect reintegration caused by market exit. 11 In some cases, several of these trends have been at work simultaneously or successively. However, it appears that, in WCA, market exit is the primary explanation for increasing state ownership or declining competition while state driven and private sector driven regulation have been the main drivers of re-integration in ESA. Indeed, market re-integration in WCA largely reflects the collapse of cotton production in marginal producing countries where private agents have exited the sector. 12 Conversely, fluctuations in the degree of competition in Zambia and Zimbabwe have resulted from reinforced regulation of the ginning sector in Zimbabwe (Poulton and Hanyami-Mlambo, 2009 ) and informal cooperation by the two biggest firms in Zambia, in an attempt to limit the scope for side-selling (Brambilla and Porto, 2009) .
As a result of this re-integration trend and of the limited scope of reforms in WCA, we find that, on average, cotton markets in SSA remain largely publicly-owned and little competitive: only nine countries out of the 25 under consideration have achieved some level of competition and over half of total SSA production still originates from markets where prices are fixed (figures 6-A and 1-E). 13 What is more, according to some analysts, even the most competitive African cotton markets would be far from perfectly competitiveespecially when the scope of reforms is put into perspective with the more general institutional and political context of the countries examined (Coocksey, 2004; Van de Walle, 2001) . Looking at the cotton sector in Tanzania, supposed to be amongst the most competitive in SSA, Larsen (2005) reports that private agents have to obtain licences from the marketing board and other administrations to enter the different segments of the cotton sector.
Finally, we observe that the recommendations formulated to countries where reforms have not been adopted or implemented yet are increasingly cautious and context-specific. Privatisation is seen as insufficient or even undesirable under certain conditions and competition as having to be controlled in certain market contexts (Baghdadli et al., 2007) . Hence, while Baffes (2005) 14 (2009 and 2010) conclude that no market sector type seems to have performed so well that it can be considered best under all circumstances. 14 Maybe as a consequence, countries where markets have barely evolved over the past three of four decades (Mali and Cameroon) seem to envision reforms that would lead to regulated rather than competitive markets.
CONCLUSION
The subject matter of this paper is to offer a comprehensive view on cotton market organisation and regulation evolution all over sub-saharan Africa. Notwithstanding a series of nuances, we find that the trends in policy evolution identified in the literature broadly hold when expanding the sample of countries under consideration in the pre-reform period and in the aftermath of reforms. This suggests that cotton policies were relatively uniform at the sub-regional level. However, our findings for the last decade significantly alter the conclusions commonly accepted. We find that the disintegration of markets engaged with reforms in some countries in the 1990s was not pursued by other countries in the following decade.
We even find a series of examples where privatisations and liberalisation have simply been reversed.
While cotton sectors are commonly described as moving towards increased disintegration, we show that trajectories are in fact less linear. Of course, this is not to say that reforms have failed everywhere.
However, while this paper does not intend to comment on the desirability of reforms, it describes the difficulty of achieving true competition, and the frequent de facto re-involvement of the states.
This finding is crucial when it comes to explaining the performance of markets post-reforms or the determinants of policy choices. Because they provide comparable information for 25 countries over 46 years, our indices offer promising opportunities for future quantitative empirical work. Indeed, analysing the impact or the causes of reforms at the sector level, with detailed information on their pace and their scope might help solve the difficult identification of supply response in the African context (Kheralla et al., 2002) or the determinants of different policy choices among countries with relatively similar economic contexts and histories.
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Finally, our findings also point to the crucial need for additional research into the modalities of state intervention in African agricultural markets. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that what we observe for cotton reforms could be similar for the reforms of other cash crops.
Figure 1. Market organisation in SSA (1961-2008)
1-A Nb of countries by d° of competition in SSA 1-B Production share by d° of competition in SSA
Competition is " strong" if many firms compete on prices and "limited" when 2 or 3 firms with a large combined market share exert price leadership. "Regulation" implies that firms operate as regional monopsonies or that supply is administratively allocated. 
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4-A Nb of countries by d° of competition in FFC 4-B Production share by d° of competition in FFC
4-C Nb of countries by d° of ownership in FFC 4-D Production share by d° of ownership in FFC
4-E Nb of countries by price system in FFC 4-F Production share by price system in FFC
5-A Nb of countries by d° of competition in FBC 5-B Production share by d° of competition in FBC
Competition is " strong" if many firms compete on prices and "limited" when 2 or 3 firms with a large combined market share exert price leadership. "Regulation" implies that firms operate as regional monopsonies or that supply is administratively allocated. Prices are fixed pan-territorially and pan-seasonally Price indication An indicative (non-binding) buying price is announced at the start of the season Free market price Prices fluctuate according to local supply and demand Controls French colony once
5-C Nb of countries by d° of ownership in FBC
The country was a French colony once (any time) British colony once
The country was a British colony once (any time) CFDT once
The CFDT has operated as a ginning monopoly (any time) British board once A British Board has operated as a ginning monopoly (any time) Other or no colonizer
The country never was a French or a British colony.
